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To the memory of Otto G. Santa Anna, whose civic life was devoted to making Arizona a better place for all its people.

To Héctor and Claire for keeping matters calm in the midst of the firestorm.

# 2

# Arizona and the Making of a State of Exclusion, 1912–2012

*Celeste González de Bustamante*

THE ARIZONA-SONORA BORDERLANDS have a long history of ecological and human contestation. Much of the land is *chaparral* (high desert): geography defined by extreme temperatures and limited natural resources, barring the exception of an abundant supply of mostly untapped solar energy. Scarce arable land and water are just two of the environmental factors that make life difficult for those who have chosen to call this region home. Extreme social, political, economic, and cultural tensions also have contributed to the region's *moral geography*. Using the concept of moral geography and through the lens and advantage of history, this chapter explains how in 2010 Arizona became known as the "Show Me Your Papers State"—that is in reference to Senate Bill (SB) 1070 signed into law by Arizona Governor Janice Brewer on April 23, which, before it was tied up in the courts, would have required local police to demand proof of a person's legal status if the officer had "reasonable suspicion" to believe that the person was in the country "without papers." That law led many reporters to ask Governor Brewer, "What does an illegal look like?" The governor responded that she didn't know what an "illegal" looked like, and she added that she was certain that there would be no racial profiling as a result of the law. As some legal scholars have noted, the law in some cases might actually *require* racial profiling. (For more on SB 1070 and racial profiling, see Chin et al., this volume, and Chin et al., 2010).

In the present chapter I make two fundamental arguments: First, the white hegemony that emerged in Arizona created and implemented strategies to exclude certain ethnic groups (including Mexicans and well as indigenous Arizonans) from social, political, economic, and cultural power

from before statehood to the present day. Although all people of color have suffered as a result of these strategies, I concentrate in this chapter on the largest ethnic minority in present-day Arizona, Latinos, who make up one-third of the state's population. At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Latinos were mostly Mexican, with nine out of ten Latinos in Arizona being either Mexican born or Mexican American.[1] This ethnic group appeared to be the target of the latest round of exclusionary policies supported by a majority of conservative whites in state elected office. Second, news media in Arizona, perhaps to a greater extent than in other states, from nineteenth century newspapers to twenty-first century bloggers, have played an important role in fomenting the efforts of those who have wielded political and economic power.[2]

Policies over the past century have been reported in the news media, first newspapers, and other "legacy media" such as radio and television, and now online. These media have played a role not just in reflecting society, but also in shaping public opinion and attitudes, and in doing so, news organizations and their staffs have been complicit in creating and perpetuating negative images of Latinos in Arizona and the United States, contributing to an environment in which legislation such as SB 1070 gained popular and political support.

## The Importance of History and Moral Geography

On February 14, 2012, the state of Arizona celebrated its centennial as the forty-eighth state of the United States of America. What happened over the past century that contributed to the current state of *this* state? The politics of exclusion and the general (mainstream) media's complicity in these politics have been influenced by three recurring themes or phenomena. These phenomena are directly connected to the state's immigration history: (1) Restrictive labor practices, especially in the areas of mining and agriculture; (2) Economic weakness and vulnerability, which made the state less able to respond to cyclical boons and busts; (3) External political and economic influence. Because the state shares a 362-mile international border with Mexico, events and developments must be put into a transnational context. What happened south of the border affected events in Arizona and vice versa. Arizona and Sonora, for better and for worse, have been more interdependent than some politicians would care to admit.[3]

Most of the U.S.-Mexico border was delineated after a two-year war between the neighboring countries and the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. As a result, Mexico, a country less than thirty years old, lost



half of its land, including California, the New Mexico Territory which included present-day Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Texas, and parts of Colorado and Wyoming (Figure 2.1). Still suffering from the economic and social effects of two decades of independence wars with Spain, Mexico had few resources to fight a U.S. invasion and was forced to hand over an enormous quantity of land for a price of $15 million. It would become "the most monumental land grab in North American history."[4] Even after the land grab, Anglo American filibusters continued into Sonora and other northern Mexican states.[5]

Arizona, north of the Gila River (see Figure 2.1), was included in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, but the southern part of Arizona, which included Tucson, Nogales, Sásabe, or everything south of the Gila River, had to wait until 1853 and the signing of the Gadsden Purchase to become part of U.S. terrain. Both Washington and Mexico City considered Arizona and New Mexico to be on the fringes of their respective domains. As a result, the residents were not a priority for the administrators of the Spanish Colonial Empire, Mexico, or the United States. Aside from a physical divide, the Gila River would come to represent an ethnic as well as political-economic division between the whiter and more prosperous area north of the river, and the browner, less prosperous region south of the demarcation. Why were Anglo Americans committed to laying claim to the land? It was obvious to *New York Daily Times* writers that the United States sought to acquire "El Paso and the country through which the Gila runs, that we may have a better Southern route to the Pacific than

**FIGURE 2.1**
**Map of the United States and Mexico, with land from the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Gadsden Purchase. Courtesy of Nicholas Kay from www.brown.edu/aravaipa.**

we now possess."[6] A little over three decades after the signing of the Gadsden Purchase, workers finished the Southern Pacific Railroad that ran through El Paso and Tucson, linking the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

From members of the Tohono O'Odham Indian Nation, whose tribal lands are roughly the size of the state of Connecticut and whose nation was sliced in half by the creation of the international boundary, to those who fought against forces in Washington, D.C., in favor of Arizona statehood, to current politicians who say they are angry over the federal government's "failure to seal the border," to the growing number of disenfranchised Latinos who feel they are being targeted by politicians, Arizona has been and continues to be contested terrain. Because of this historical tension among various social and ethnic groups, it is useful to conceptualize the struggle over what to do about immigrants and immigration (in this case mainly undocumented migrants and migration) as a debate over Arizona's *moral geography.*

Moral geography can be described as a contested space where ethical choices are made about "a particular people and place, and . . . also an 'internal logic' that belongs to a particular people and place."[7] Bluntly put, Arizona residents had distinct visions about what was right and good, and what was wrong and bad for the region. During the course of the twentieth century, the first century of mass media, newspapers, film, radio, and television played an important role in shaping and reflecting conflicting moral geographies that were debated. The moral geography of the Arizona-Sonora region of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands has been fraught with a series of ideological fault lines; with one of the most prominent fractures at the international boundary. Another schism is marked by the Gila River, which became a locus of political divisions between the more populated and Anglo Maricopa County and home of the state capital of Phoenix, and Southern Arizona, the state's second most populated area, and whose population historically has had a higher percentage of Mexican origin residents. Fault lines can be thought of as physical as well as ideological lines that shift during "hot moments."[8] The major "events" that jolted the region's inhabitants that this chapter discusses include: the Great Depression of the 1930s and subsequent "repatriation" of Mexican origin residents; the U.S. Border Patrol's mass deportation effort of 1954, "Operation Wetback," and the resurgence of nativism in the 1970s and 1980s in the midst of economic downturn. A more recent "hot moment" includes the 2010 signing of Arizona's SB 1070. Thus, as the means through which we communicate on a mass scale, mainstream media of the twentieth century and mediated communications of the twenty-first century have both shaped and reflected conflicting moral geographies that continue to be debated. In other words, it is through media content, whether on screen or in print, where moral geographies appear as representations of reality and the very *ideological soul* of a community.



## Historical Antecedents: The Making of a State of Exclusion

In Arizona—as in other contested lands—the dominant moral geography was defined by people who held economic and political power. These power brokers, some of them politicians as well as owners of media outlets, worked to become the arbiters of social and cultural attitudes and behaviors. Prior to Spanish contact, indigenous peoples including Apaches, Opata, Tohono O'Odham, and Pima battled over control of the terrain. When the Spanish arrived in Tucson in the late eighteenth century they established a *presidio,* which became the Empire's northernmost garrison. Through missionary projects and presidios, the Spanish crown attempted to control the Native American groups that had occupied the region long before European contact. Then, by the mid-nineteenth century, driven by similar desires of the Spaniards before them, and spurred by the California gold rush, outsiders from the West and East drifted into the Sonoran Desert. The possibility of "striking it rich" was no secret in the Arizona-Sonora region, which had a long-established mining tradition. By the late seventeenth century income from Sonoran mines accounted for as much as a third of the silver mined in all of Nueva Vizcaya, the Spanish colonial province that included much of present-day U.S. Southwest and northern Mexico.[9]

Frontiersmen set up mining operations in Tubac (south of Tucson) and in the Prescott area (north of Phoenix). The California gold rush of 1849 brought some 50,000 people across southern Arizona including Tucson on their way west.[10] Those who passed through had disdain for the former Mexican pueblo. Travelers, including newspaper writers such as John E. Durivage of the *New Orleans Daily Picayune* were some of the first Anglos to describe Tucson as a "miserable old place garrisoned by about one hundred men."[11]

Those types of comments did not dissuade all would-be settlers. Samuel Heintzelman, a German entrepreneur, and Charles Debrille Poston established the Sonora Mining and Exploring Company to mine for gold in southern Arizona. The two used the abandoned presidio of Tubac as their company headquarters. Anglo companies were dependent on Mexican labor, and this began a long-standing practice of discrimination against Mexican workers. Anglo workers were paid thirty to seventy dollars a month, while Mexican laborers garnered twelve to fifteen dollars a month.[12] Mexican and Native American workers were also forced to live in substandard sections of the company towns. Mining barons claimed that Mexican laborers were "less capable due to less nourishing food," and that "they would be demoralized by a higher wage scale."[13]

Settlers found pockets of gold in northern Arizona as well which paved the way for increased development and the shifting of power from Tucson

to above the Gila River. By 1863 Congress passed the Arizona Organic Act, making Fort Whipple the first capital of the Arizona Territory. Power and control over the territory ensued as the capital was moved to Prescott, then to Tucson, and then back to Prescott.[14] Anglos north of the Gila River avoided setting up the territorial seat in Tucson—which had been the historical political center of the region—because of their concerns over warring Apaches and Mexican power holders.

As in other parts of the West and Southwest, the arrival of Anglo newspapers coincided with mining interests. Barbara Cloud argues that these early newspapers acted as "boosters" for emerging Western and mining towns—and that they helped to "legitimize" the affairs of local business people.[15] These booster efforts provided written justification for the Manifest Destiny attitudes and behaviors of "pioneers." After all, it was a journalist who coined the term *Manifest Destiny* in the mid-nineteenth century. In his magazine *United States Magazine and Democratic Review*, John L. O'Sullivan wrote in 1839:

> The expansive future is our arena, and for our country. . . . The far-reaching, the boundless future will be the era of American greatness. In its magnificent domain of space and time, the nation of many nations is destined to manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles, to establish on earth the noblest temple ever dedicated to the worship of the Most High—the Sacred and the True.[16]

In 1845, O'Sullivan used the term overtly when he praised the annexation of Texas claiming the "fulfillment of our *manifest destiny* to overspread the continent allotted by the Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions."[17]

In the U.S. West and Southwest, "free development" meant capitalist development, and that included the freedom of newspaper owners to set up shop. The capitalist desires of newspaper editors and the political pleasures of frontier residents often blurred, and it appears Arizona was a "special case." The first Secretary of the Arizona Territory Richard McCormick, who hailed from New York, quickly tapped into his East Coast journalism experience by setting up the *Miner* in Prescott. In 1867, three years after he was appointed Territorial Secretary, McCormick became the Territorial Governor, when he moved south to the new, but brief capital in Tucson. Before moving, he sold his paper to mining prospector John Marion, who commented that the *Miner* would be an "organ of the White People of Arizona," illuminating an overt strategy to cater to a certain readership.[18]

To say that once Anglo settlers arrived in Arizona they immediately usurped power overnight from the region's Mexican elite would both understate the importance of Mexican-origin power brokers in towns like Tucson, as well as oversimplify the process of cultural contestation and collaboration. The demographics of migration helped transfer power from the state's Mexican elite to a white dominant power. By and large most of the Anglo settlers were men. An 1860 federal census showed that out of 168 Anglos living in Tucson, 160 were men.[19] These men frequently married into Mexican families, which is how many managed to move into elite circles. Despite the growing presence of Anglo-owned storefronts, Tucson retained a bicultural atmosphere, making it distinct from other communities in the Southwest. As Sheridan states about communities like Tucson, Florence, and Yuma, "Mexicans assimilated Anglos rather than the other way around."[20] By statehood though, it was clear that the lion's share of economic and political power had shifted into Anglo hands.



Labor practices and processes helped move power from one ethnic group to another. With the building of the Southern Pacific Railroad, West and East Coast entrepreneurs needed another steady supply of labor. This time Chinese workers provided most of the cheap labor, as they were paid one dollar a day, fifty cents less than Anglo workers. That Chinese workers dominated the railroad construction jobs heightened racial tensions between Mexicans and Chinese. Even after the railroad had been inaugurated the Spanish-language newspaper *El Fronterizo* reported, "The Chinaman is a fungus that lives in isolation, sucking the sap of other plants."[21] On March 20, 1880, with dignitaries from San Francisco aboard, the Southern Pacific Railroad officially chugged into Tucson.[22]

The arrival of the railroad drastically changed the political economies of towns such as Tucson which had historically been interdependent with cities south of the border. When the trains arrived, they brought with them economic interests based on East-West trade, and this forced many Mexican owned companies out of business. Along with the loss of their businesses, entrepreneurs such as the Tully and Ochoa families began to lose political power. The Tully and Ochoa trucking company represented one of the few successful Anglo Mexican business enterprises. Estevan Ochoa, an exception to the circumstances and experience of most Mexican-origin people in Arizona of the time, managed to serve several terms on the Arizona Territorial legislature, and in 1875 was elected mayor of Tucson.[23]

By the early part of the twentieth century, with the railroads built and the country in an economic recession, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. This law aimed to severely restrict Asian immigration and prohibited Chinese from becoming naturalized citizens. As a result, the demand for Mexican labor increased once the economy picked up again. During the latter part of the nineteenth century numerical restrictions on

Mexican immigration had not yet been implemented, and Mexican nationals were not barred from citizenship. Indeed, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed in 1848, stipulated that all Mexican citizens living in the new U.S. Southwest would be granted automatic citizenship.

As Anglo migration to the Arizona Territory increased and as the territory became more interconnected with transcontinental business enterprises, many residents clamored for statehood, though Washington was not sure that Arizona was ready to stand alone. The battle over statehood illuminated the desires and discriminatory attitudes of some of Arizona's and the country's Anglo politicians. Many Democrats in Congress argued against statehood claiming that neither Arizona nor New Mexico were economically sufficient enough to sustain themselves, and that "neither the desert sands of Arizona" nor the "humble Spanish-speaking people of New Mexico" were prepared for admission into the union.[24] Indiana Republican Alfred Beveridge came up with what he thought was an ideal plan—combine the two territories into one and make Arizona and New Mexico one state. New Mexicans voted in favor of the proposal, while Arizonans voted against it. One of the reasons Arizonans shied away from joint statehood with New Mexico related to the racist and discriminatory attitudes of the number of Anglos in high-ranking political positions, that New Mexico had too many Mexicans. This prompted one South Carolina senator to claim that Arizona's opposition to joint statehood was "a cry of a pure blooded white community against the domination of a mixed breed aggregation of citizens of New Mexico, who are Spaniards, Indians, Greasers, Mexicans and everything else."[25] These sorts of sentiments often were printed without question or critical analysis in local and national newspapers.

Newspapers also printed pejorative statements about Mexican miners who organized to protest the mining industry's two-tier wage practice and systemic discrimination.[26] Reports often portrayed Mexican workers involved in labor movements as "bandits" who were "easily swayed by agitators," who had the potential for carrying out a "race war."[27] By the early part of the twentieth century, negative stereotypes about Mexicans and immigrants were well entrenched in the public and political discourse, which worked to strengthen a dominant moral geography of Arizona.[28] Images of Mexicans as "bandits" gained more traction with the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920), especially after Pancho Villa's infamous raid on Columbus, New Mexico, on March 8, 1916. Although Villa had signed a contract with a Hollywood film studio and garnered some favorable news coverage, by and large national newspapers such as those owned by the Hearst family often portrayed him and other revolutionaries as "comic-opera bandits, ruthless, uncouth, and uncivilized."[29] In 1914, two years prior to Villa's raid, *The World Herald* printed these words about the revolutionary:



> Everything that has been told of Villa shows him as a monster of brutality and cruelty. His entire history is that of a robber and assassin, lifted now, by the fortunes of war, into a conspicuous position which he has filled with such signal military ability as to give him a coating of semi-respectability.[30]

Undoubtedly, these depictions of Villa and other revolutionaries had real on the ground consequences for Mexicans who headed north trying to escape the violence in their country. On the Mexican side of the border, Villa and other revolutionaries such as Emiliano Zapata were hailed as national heroes.

## U.S. Immigration Policy, 1921–1965

While Mexico struggled through more than a decade of civil war, the United States went to war in Europe. Both conflicts had consequences for immigration and border policy and what Ngai calls a "new global age."[31] In Mexico, as many as two million people died in the Revolution—a number that totaled more than one-fifth of the country's population.[32] Thousands survived by migrating north into the United States. At the same time, back from involvement in World War I, U.S. officials, who had grown increasingly concerned about its nation's borders, sought to stop the number of refugees heading north from Mexico and south from Canada by passing new security and legal measures. The importance of the nation-state and territoriality led to the creation of the U.S. Border Patrol at this time and also gave life to a new social category and enduring concept—"illegal alien."[33]

In 1924, Congress passed the Immigration Act, which continued to exclude the Chinese, as well as the "mentally retarded" and the "insane" from the country. The act established quotas for the first time, placing limits on the number of immigrants who could legally enter the country to 150,000 per year. That figure represented less than 15 percent of the immigration rate prior to World War I, when approximately one million people a year entered the country. The law created procedures for the deportation of unauthorized immigrants. The 1924 Immigration Act had several important consequences. Perhaps the most insidious was that it created a new class of people, "illegal immigrants." The term *illegal immigrant* had class and racial dimensions. Ngai sums up the public and legal discourse about the distinctions among European and Canadian and Latino immigrants:

> Europeans and Canadians tended to be disassociated from the real and imagined category of illegal alien, which facilitated their national and racial assimilation as white Americans. In contrast, Mexicans emerged as the iconic illegal

aliens. Illegal status became constitutive of a racialized Mexican identity and of Mexicans' exclusion from the national community and polity.[34]

That Mexicans became the "iconic illegal aliens" was no accident. During the century prior, white America constructed a pejorative image of Mexican-origin people through media, travel accounts, and political discourse.[35] These images went part and parcel with embedded notions of racial superiority among the white hegemony in the Southwest as well as in Washington, D.C.

By 1930, with a quota system based on country of origin in place and the beginning of a depression, the U.S. government had the tools necessary to deport almost 39,000 persons.[36] In regards to the Mexican-origin peoples who were mostly living in states such as California, Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, the U.S. government implemented a "repatriation" program, which led to the deportation of as many as one million Mexicans and Mexican Americans, many of whom were citizens. Deportees were rounded up in mining towns like Miami and Globe, Arizona (Figure 2.2).

Sending workers to their home country during times of economic downturn had begun prior to the Great Depression. In the 1910s and 1920s, U.S. authorities had initiated the process of putting miners and field hands on boxcar trains and sending them south.[37] Not surprisingly, it became commonplace on playgrounds[38] and in work environments for whites to make



**FIGURE 2.2**
**Photo of "repatriation" in Miami, Arizona, 1930s. Courtesy of Arizona State University Libraries.**



comments suggesting that Mexicans and other people of color, whether U.S. born or not, should "go back home," meaning to their home countries.

Despite obvious connections between the economy and immigration, public policy began to move away from recognizing economic realities to emphasizing the importance of national boundaries when it came to justifying deportation.[39] Authorities increasingly stressed the difference between those who crossed national borders legally and those who entered "illegally." A *Los Angeles Times* newspaper article published on January 26, 1931, reported that C. P. Visel, coordinator for the citizens' committee on relief of unemployment in Los Angeles, claimed that the elimination of Mexican immigrants, "will give many jobs they are occupying to natives of this country and aliens who have made legal entry."[40]

World War II and the need for the country to produce materials for the war effort brought the country out of recession and increased demands for labor. By 1942, U.S. and Mexican officials had crafted a temporary guest worker system known as the *Bracero* (Spanish for "one who works with his arms") program, which sought to bring in cheap labor primarily from Mexico, but also from the Bahamas, Barbados, as well as Canada, although 70 percent of the workers came from Mexico.[41] This demonstrated that in Arizona and in other parts of the country in boom times, Mexicans were welcomed as workers, but they were shunned during economic downturns. If they did not leave voluntarily, the U.S. government established programs to deport them, such as "Operation Wetback," a mass deportation program, in 1954.[42] Three years prior to the official implementation of "Operation Wetback," *Los Angeles Times* reporter Bill Dredge's front-page article stated that: "In March, a total of 16,000 flowed across the international boundary as wetbacks and were returned, along the 275 miles of mountainous, desert border from Arizona to the Pacific."[43]

Not all white Americans supported the effort to deport. The same article included interviews with farmers who complained about the sudden departure of their labor pool, claiming that Americans were not equipped to compete with their Mexican counterparts because Americans "won't do this kind of work. They can't. It gets too hot to kneel out here and tie carrots—too hot for everybody but these Mexican *braceros*." On June 10, 1954, it was clear that the farmers' arguments and complaints had not persuaded U.S. immigration restrictionists to change their strategy. U.S. Border Patrol officials geared up for the deportation operation, and the *Los Angeles Times* ran a story with the headline, "Government Maps War on Wetbacks." The report read that:

> A major war on wetbacks, employing a reinforcement of 491 immigration officers recruited from all parts of the country will be launched along the California-Mexico border next Thursday to send tens of thousands of illegally entered Mexican aliens back into Mexico.[44]

Once they were apprehended they were to be taken to a "collection station" in Nogales, Arizona, where they were to be released into Mexico.

The *Los Angeles Times* reporter's use of the discourse of war to refer to a group of people from a country with whom the United States was at peace illustrates the level of tension between Anglos and Mexicans in California and the Southwest at the time. It also brings into sharp relief notions about acceptable terms to use in public. The uncritical use of the term *wetbacks* in reference to unauthorized Mexicans was commonplace in newspapers throughout this period. Undocumented immigrants who crossed the northern border via Canada were not referred to in this way in the news media or in public discourse, providing evidence of the ethnic and class dimensions to labor and immigration policies.

Discriminatory practices in Arizona went beyond new male migrants. Female citizens of Mexican origin were excluded from certain economic opportunities. Companies such as Mountain Telephone and Telegraph purposely excluded Mexican American women (who undoubtedly were native speakers of American English) from clerical positions such as operators because company executives assumed they had "language difficulties."[45] (See Leeman, this volume, for Arizona's contemporary linguistic prejudices.) Ethnic and racial segregation extended to the educational system, where Mexican-origin students were either sent to separate and inferior schools or a "Mexican Room."[46] (See Gándara, this volume, for details about ethnic segregation in Arizona schoolrooms.)

Although the 1924 Immigration Act remained in effect for more than four decades, it was fraught with problems and challenges, and as a result Congress amended the law thirty-two times between 1953 and 1964.[47] By 1965, the political and economic winds had changed, which enabled federal lawmakers to pass the "most open and egalitarian immigration law in the twentieth century."[48] Low levels of immigration and a booming economy created a political environment that allowed Congress to pass the 1965 Immigration Act. The law, signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, eliminated racially motivated national origin quotas and repealed policies that had their roots in the Chinese Exclusion Act, which severely restricted immigration from Asian-Pacific nations. Instead of national quotas, preference was to be given to individuals with special education and skills. The law also placed a priority on family unification. Although the law did away with quotas based on nation of origin, for the first time it capped the number of immigrants from the Western Hemisphere, including individuals from Canada and Mexico, to a total of 120,000 annually. Many supporters of the act, including President Johnson, did not foresee how much influence it would have on the face of America. In fact, President Johnson stated the law would not "reshape the structure of our daily lives or add importantly to either our wealth or our power."[49] The law



reflected the country's sentiments at the height of the civil rights movement. Before the U.S. House and Senate passage of the law, in a letter to the editor of *The New York Times*, Edward Corsi, Chairman of the Board of the American Council for Nationalities Service, opined, "Let us wholeheartedly support the bills, which would remove ancient and outmoded discrimination in our immigration law and which would advance our own national welfare."[50]

Back in Arizona, the state's two largest cities benefited from post–World War II economic development, and city leaders in Phoenix and Tucson looked for ways to modernize their growing urban centers. In Tucson, city officials sought to change the urban geography by razing the downtown area known as *La Calle* (literally, "the street"). After decades of neglect and as land values began to soar, city leaders created a plan to "clean up" the area by demolishing homes and neighborhoods, paving the way for the Tucson Community Center. It was no accident that this part of Tucson was home to the city's largest Mexican and black communities. News media and publicity campaigns painted those who promoted the urban development plan as "unselfish negotiators working for the betterment of the city and all Tucsonans."[51] In reality, the plan reflected notions of a moral geography that dismissed the aspirations of lower income Mexicans and blacks, further excluding the political participation of working class people of color, while prioritizing the interests and desires of the city's mostly white elite. City leaders inaugurated the new Tucson Community Center in 1971.

## Post–Civil Rights Era and New Age of Migration

By the 1970s, with the civil rights era nearing an end, and the country again in the midst of a recession prompted by the nation's dependency on foreign oil, nativists returned to a familiar historical pattern and blamed immigrants for the country's economic problems. In 1976, the issue of undocumented migration took on special significance in states such as Arizona where residents *perceived* to a greater extent than other people around the country that the number of undocumented people was increasing.[52] By 1977, undocumented migrants became scapegoats for the country's economic woes.[53] The same year, President Jimmy Carter asked Congress to devise an immigration reform plan to include: (1) sanctions on employers who hired undocumented workers; (2) an increase in U.S. Border Patrol resources; and (3) an amnesty plan for undocumented immigrants already in the country.[54] By 1980, in a Roper Organization public opinion poll, 91 percent of those surveyed thought the government should make an "all out effort" to stem the "tide of illegal immigrants."[55] In March 1981, the Carter Commission on Immigration and

Refugee Policy issued its final report, which included the three major elements that Carter had recommended.

Televised news reports during the 1970s allowed a complex picture about the Arizona-Sonora borderlands and its moral geographies to come into focus. News media portrayals about undocumented immigrants illuminated conflicting ideas about how the region should be defined, and who was allowed to define it. On October 29, 1977, Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard David Duke paid a visit to Tucson, Arizona. In an interview televised on the local CBS affiliate KOLD-TV, Duke announced the Klan's plans to patrol the American side of the U.S.-Mexico border. Lee Joslyn reported that Klansmen:

> Intend to detain the illegal aliens until authorities can be notified to their whereabouts. It is believed that at least three or maybe even four dozen members will be concentrating on the state's southeastern border. And word is Douglas, Arizona is where they plan to start.[56]

A year later, on the same television station, community activist Margo Cowan refuted claims that undocumented workers were taking jobs away from Americans, stating:

> I would challenge you to find young American Blacks, young Chicanos and heads of households that would work in laundries, work in fields, work in hotels, work in hospitals for a buck ninety-five an hour, or fifty or sixty hours a week.[57]

Because of its ability to reach thousands of viewers at a time, local and national television programs became the principle vehicle through which the moral geographies could be constructed as well as articulated. From U.S. Border Patrol agents and anti-immigrant groups to Chicano activists, all shared their views of the immigration debate and the borderlands on television. In so doing, they contributed to the construction of moral geographies that would be reinforced as well as contested on the air.

By 1986, the U.S. Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). This was the last major reform to U.S. immigration policy. The law allowed to individuals who had entered the United States without authorization prior to 1982 and who had been living continuously in the United States to file for legal residency—what some would call amnesty. The law also included penalties for employers who knowingly hired undocumented workers.

## Changing Arizona and U.S.-Mexico Border, 1994–2000

By 1990, Arizona's population and economy boomed as it became one of the fastest-growing states in the nation. Between 1990 and 2000, the population



soared by 40 percent.[58] New residents came from within the United States, as well as from outside of the country. Yet, what seemed to worry the state's conservative political wing was the fact that growth among Latinos outpaced their white counterparts. The surge in Latino residents was in large part driven by economic forces. The housing market soared like never before. News reports during the 1990s used the phrase "an acre an hour," in reference to how much of the Arizona desert was being razed for housing development. In other words, the construction industry wanted cheap labor to keep up with market demands, and Mexico provided it, as it had done in the past. The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which supporters claimed would reduce immigration, actually became another "pull factor" for Mexican workers. The undoing of trade barriers allowed foreign companies to move into Mexican agricultural markets, including the important area of corn production. U.S. corn producers ended up undercutting small farmers in southern Mexico, especially in the states of Chiapas and Oaxaca. Unable to compete on the world market, Oaxacan and other farmers in southern Mexico were forced north to the United States and Canada to look for another way to earn a living. For the first time Oaxaca and Chiapas became two of the largest "sending" states in the 1990s and first decade of 2000.

Federal limits on the number of individuals allowed to enter the country from Mexico and other countries did not coincide with the U.S. demand for cheap labor, especially in states like Arizona. Public frustrations over an apparent increase in undocumented migration, mainly across the southern border, prompted authorities to implement a new strategy of immigration enforcement. The strategy involved three basic elements: (1) Dramatic escalation in the number of U.S. Border Patrol agents along the entire U.S.-Mexico border; (2) The use of high technology to "secure the border"; and (3) Physical buildup of the border, through walls and the expansion of ports of entry. This strategy aimed to deter migrants away from urban areas, thereby forcing them to traverse more "hostile terrain," and signaled a clear departure from the agency's previous approach of waiting to apprehend migrants after they crossed the border.[59] The strategy of deterrence began in El Paso in 1993 when the U.S. Border Patrol implemented "Operation Blockade," better known by its subsequent title "Operation Hold-the-Line." The following year, the agency implemented "Operation Gatekeeper" in San Diego, with local support from conservatives such as gubernatorial incumbent Republican Pete Wilson, who won reelection by scapegoating immigrants for the state's economic woes.[60] With a crackdown in place in San Diego and El Paso, the Arizona desert was transformed into a deadly crossing for migrants. The border patrol implemented a similar approach to discourage unauthorized entry at urban centers at the Arizona-Sonora border near Nogales. As expected, migrants were not deterred from crossing; they only

shifted their crossing points away from urban ports of entry to some of the most inhospitable parts of the country. By mid-2011, the death toll of unauthorized crossers reported along the U.S.-Mexico border had reached more than 5,000, with most migrants having perished in the Sonoran Desert.[61] All of this led to what scholars call a "thickening" of the border region,[62] or what human rights activists call a militarized zone.

The militarization of the border could only happen with approval from federal lawmakers and support from a vocal public. Signed in 1996 by then-President Bill Clinton, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) enabled the U.S. Border Patrol to expand its efforts. The law funded one thousand additional border patrol agents per year over five years. Stiffer sanctions against employers who knowingly hired undocumented workers also became part of the legislation, as well as employee verification pilot programs; precursors to what would become E-verify.[63] On the state level, Arizona politicians clamored for even greater enforcement, and conservatives began to draft a new host of anti-immigrant measures that would attack the growing number of Latinos, primarily Mexicans, residing in the state. As this chapter has revealed, this was not the first time this ethnic group was targeted.

As the border thickened, national media seemed to march in unison with militarization efforts. Between the 1970s and 1990s, graphic and textual representations of the U.S.-Mexico border changed in tandem with the increase in immigration enforcement. In the 1970s, television news reports about Mexican immigration had depicted the U.S.-Mexico border as a "thin line." By the 1990s, in both graphics and photographs, the border frequently became a thicker and often darker "red line."[64] Stories about Mexican immigration moved away from nonborder cities in the United States and Mexico to the border itself. One study of network news reports about Mexican immigration aired between 1971 and 2000 showed a dramatic increase in connecting immigration with the border. In the decade of the 1970s, just over 20 percent had a dateline at the U.S.-Mexico border. During the 1990s, Mexican immigration reports with a dateline at the border represented 61 percent of stories.[65]

## Arizona's Perceived "Triple Threat"

Over the past century, Arizona has gone from one of the least populated states to the nation's fourteenth most populous state by 2008.[66] The increase in population involved a shift in the state's demographics: by 2010, Latinos made up one-third of the state's population. At this historical juncture, in



the midst of the worst global recession in fifty years, a conservative governor in place, and almost nine years after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, Arizona politicians took aim at a perceived triple threat: (1) the U.S.-Mexico border—a place where presumably terrorists from any country could enter, and drug violence could "spill over" into the United States; (2) a vulnerable economy—a system that remained overly dependent on the volatile construction and tourism sectors, which in the Great Recession of 2008 has not ended in Arizona. (See Gans, this volume, for a balanced economic analysis that belies this one-dimensional view.) At the writing of this chapter, the Phoenix metro area had the second highest foreclosure rate in the country;[67] and (3) changing demographics—conservative politicians feared an increase in Latinos in the state would alter the culture and politics of a state that had been dominated by white hegemony for more than one hundred years.

Despite these perceived threats, studies showed that since 2007, undocumented migration was at a thirty-year low. Part of the reason was economic: with fewer jobs in Arizona, less migrants headed into the state. Douglas Massey's research showed that other factors influencing Mexicans' decisions to head north were at play, including rising educational levels and a reduction in the Mexican birth rate, along with violence along Mexico's northern border.[68] Further, contrary to the heated political rhetoric of 2010, crime had dropped in all states with the highest numbers of undocumented residents. Across the border from Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, the city of El Paso ranked as *the* safest city in the United States, according to CQ Press's ranking of cities with a population of more than 500,000. San Diego came in at number five.[69] Although drug violence was a real problem on the Mexican side of the border, in contrast to what some Arizona politicians and border and nonborder sheriffs had stated during the election season, border communities in the United States were relatively safe, and according to public opinion polls, residents who lived in border areas felt safe.[70] Nevertheless, 2010 was an election year, and candidates who clamored to "secure the border" and "clamp down on illegal immigration" got votes, especially in Arizona. Republican Governor Janice Brewer saw her numbers jump almost immediately after she signed SB 1070. Governor Brewer first moved into the state's chief executive office in 2008, after President Barack Obama appointed then Democratic Governor Janet Napolitano to head the Department of Homeland Security. Brewer was elected in November 2010, much like her California counterpart, Governor Pete Wilson in 1994, after he called for the passage the anti-immigrant referendum, Proposition 187. Brewer's signing of SB 1070 on April 23, 2010, codified another chapter of exclusion in Arizona's history. The measure's passage ignited widespread protests among activists and ordinary citizens

who demanded just and humane immigration reform. News coverage of the movement against SB 1070 signaled the existence of another vision and moral geography for Arizona's future: one that emphasized what immigrant activists as well as those who understood the global realities of immigration deemed was right for authorized and unauthorized borderlanders.

Over the past one hundred years, Arizonans and especially Latinos have endured a legacy of discriminatory patterns and practices that once again resurfaced in 2010. Even before the arrival of the first Anglo settlers, the region had been a conflict zone, where inhabitants struggled to survive in a place of extremely limited natural and economic resources. White hegemony added new and long-standing ethnic and class dimensions to the practice of defining power, and to the struggle over the moral geography of the region. News content printed and aired through media outlets owned primarily by white businessmen served to reinforce the ideas and attitudes of the dominant group.

Although white elected officials have retained a majority at the state level for the past century, Arizona's history has been marked by deep political and regional divisions. A political grand canyon has deepened over the past two decades between the more populated and conservative county of Maricopa (essentially the Phoenix metropolitan area) and southern Arizona, mainly less conservative Pima County (essentially the Tucson metropolitan area). Because state politics and money have been controlled in the state capital of Phoenix, no matter what their ethnic backgrounds, many Tucsonans and southern Arizonans frequently have spoken of feeling alienated from state-level decision making. By 2010, some felt so disenfranchised they initiated a campaign to create a new state, Baja Arizona, with the capital being seated in Tucson. Ironically, the boundaries of the new state (if it would ever come to be) would basically comprise the area south of the Gila River, roughly the area of the state that was included in the Gadsden Purchase.

An iconic part of Tucson's landscape, Tumamoc Hill remains a popular place for area hikers and naturalists. Those who frequent the hill cannot help notice its geography, as well as the view at the top, which offers an expansive perspective of Arizona's second largest city. Just a few miles from the city's downtown, giant saguaro cacti distinguish the hill and surrounding area as unequivocally part of the Sonoran Desert. More than 2,500 years ago indigenous peoples inhabited the top of the hill, and later the Tohono O'Odham maintained spiritual ties to the area. The view from atop Tumamoc calls to mind the history of fast-paced development characteristic of many Southwest cities. Observant walkers notice the concave shape at its base, evidence of nineteenth century quarrying by laborers (more than likely of Mexican descent) who hauled volcanic rock to various parts of the city for construction of area buildings, including the University of Arizona. Evidence and



memories of development efforts can be spotted easily, such as the late 1960s urban renewal project that led to the destruction of historically Mexican and black neighborhoods. Occasionally, the peaceful sounds of nature are interrupted by whistles from the nearby Southern Pacific Railroad trains, or by U.S. Border Patrol helicopters flying by. At the same time, Tumamoc stands as an island of diversity in Arizona. The hill beckons to people of all "walks of life," who are up for the challenge of climbing the 700-foot incline, including news photographers who use the spot to take majestic and wide-angle shots of the sprawling Tucson valley. Certainly, the Arizona-Sonora border region has been defined by contestation, but on any given sweltering Saturday morning, Native Americans, Asians, Anglos, African Americans, and Latinos of all ages, walk individually, and in groups, all with the same goal: to reach the summit.

## Notes

1. "Demographic Profile of Hispanics in Arizona," Pew Hispanic Center, 2008. Retrieved 14 February 2011 from http://pewhispanic.org/states/?stateid=AZ.
2. Chomsky, 1988.
3. Lujan Cadava, 2008; Chavez, 2004; Wong González, 2004.
4. Sheridan, 1995, p. 51.
5. Rippy, 1922.
6. "The Mexican Boundary," *New York Daily Times*, August 4, 1853, p. 4.
7. Opie, 1998; Taylor, 2007, and in press.
8. González de Bustamante, 2011; Lévi-Strauss, 1966, p. 259; Schwartz, 1982.
9. Radding, 1997, p. 36.
10. Sheridan, 1995, p. 53.
11. Sheridan, 1995, p. 65.
12. Sheridan, 1995, p. 65.
13. Pierce Williams to Harry Hopkins, Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), October 7, 1933, FERA Records, NARA, cited in Ríos Bustamante, 1998.
14. Sheridan, 1995, p. 70. Phoenix became Arizona's territorial capital in 1889.
15. Cloud, 2008, p. 67.
16. Cloud, 2008, pp. 205–206; cf. O'Sullivan, 1839.
17. Cloud, 2008, p. 206; cf. O'Sullivan, 1839.
18. Cloud, 2008, p. 120.
19. Sheridan, 1995, p. 109. See also Benton-Cohen, 2009.
20. Sheridan, 1995, p. 110.
21. *El Fronterizo*, August 4, 1894, cited in Sheridan, 1992, p. 84.
22. Sheridan, 1992, p. 55.
23. Martinez, 2001, p. 25.
24. Sheridan, 1995, p. 174.
25. Sheridan, 1995, p. 174. Also see Nieto-Phillips, 2004, pp. 90–91.

26. Benton-Cohen, 2009, pp. 80–119, 198–238. "In August 1914, [Arizona] Governor Hunt . . . visited Ray [Arizona] and called conditions for the Mexican miners there 'feudalism'" (p. 204).
27. Meeks, 2001.
28. Martinez, 2001, p. 56.
29. Katz, 1998, p. 323.
30. Katz, 1998, p. 323.
31. Ngai, 2003, pp. 69–107.
32. Buchenau, 2008, p. 90.
33. Ngai, 2003, pp. 69–107.
34. Ngai, 2003, p. 72.
35. Nieto-Phillips, 2004, pp. 69–73, 90–94; Benton-Cohen, 2009, pp. 86–104, 184–185, 235–242, 256.
36. Ngai, 2003, pp. 69–107.
37. *Mohave County Miner and Our Mineral Wealth*, May 5, 1922, p. 8. See also, Benton-Cohen, 2009, and Sheridan, 1995, p. 216.
38. In 1920, in a strange act reminiscent of the 1917 Bisbee deportation of over one thousand striking miners (many of whom were Mexican or Mexican American), 400 Mexican American children were ritually marched out of an integrated school and through downtown Bisbee, Arizona, to a segregated school (Benton-Cohen, 2009, p. 231).
39. Ngai, 2003, pp. 69–107.
40. "Unified Effort to Oust Aliens Being Evolved," *Los Angeles Times*, January 26, 1931, p. A1.
41. Reimers, 1992, p. 41.
42. Even the official language of U.S. institutions demonstrates Anglo American racial disdain. The Border Patrol's program employed an extremely derogatory term for Mexican immigrant.
43. Dredge, 1950, p. 1.
44. "Government Maps War on Wetbacks: 491 Additional Immigration Men to Join in Mass Roundup of Aliens," *Los Angeles Times*, June 10, 1954, p. A13.
45. Flores, 1951/1973, pp. 16–31.
46. De la Trinidad, 2008.
47. Gimpel and Edwards, 1999, p. 99.
48. Gimpel and Edwards, 1999, p. 100.
49. Ludden, 2006.
50. Corsi, 1965, p. 38.
51. Otero, 2011, p. 91.
52. Fernández and Pedroza, 1981.
53. Leach and Zamora, 2006.
54. Griswold del Castillo, 1992/1993.
55. Lee, 1998, p. 28; Santa Ana, 2002.
56. Lee Joslyn, "KKK/Border Patrol," *KOLD-TV News*, October 29, 1977. The KOLD-TV videotapes analyzed for this period are housed at the Arizona Historical Society (Tucson, AZ), hereon after AHS.



57. Margo Cowan, "Alien Hearing," *KOLD-TV News*, September 1, 1978, AHS.
58. http://www.azcommerce.com/EconInfo/Demographics/
59. "Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond: National Strategy," U.S. Border Patrol, 1994, p. 7, cited in Timothy Dunn, *Blockading the Border and Human Rights: The El Paso Operation That Remade Immigration Enforcement* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), p. 2.
60. Santa Ana, 2002, chapter 3.
61. Derechos Humanos/Human Rights Organization. Retrieved 7 July 2011 from http://derechoshumanosaz.net/projects/arizona-recovered-bodies-project/.
62. Andreas, 2003.
63. Gimpel and Edwards, 1999, p. 293.
64. Johnson, 2003.
65. Johnson, 2003.
66. R. Saenz, *Latinos, Whites, and the Shifting Demography of Arizona*, Population Reference Bureau. Retrieved 22 February 2011 from http://www.prb.org/Articles/2010/usarizonalatinos.aspx.
67. "Phoenix No. 2 in foreclosures; Tucson is 19th highest in US." *Arizona Daily Star*, July 29, 2011, p. A14.
68. Massey and Sánchez, 2010. For a news report on Massey and Sánchez' findings, see D. Cave, "Better Lives for Mexicans Cut Allure of Going North." (July 6, 2011). *The New York Times*, July 6, 2011. Retrieved 6 July 2011 from http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/07/06/world/americas/immigration.html?emc=eta1.
69. CQ Press City Crime Rankings 2010–2011. Retrieved 7 July 2011 from http://os.cqpress.com/citycrime/2010/City_Crime_Rankings_bypop_2011-2011.pdf.
70. "Border Community Security Poll," Border Network for Human Rights Report, August 2010. Retrieved 22 February 2010 from https://org2.democracyinaction.org/o/5681/images/BorderPollREPORT.pdf.

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# 3

# A Chronology of Exclusion in Arizona and the United States, 1880–2011

*Celeste González de Bustamante*

THE FOLLOWING CHRONOLOGY outlines the avenues through which federal and state-elected officials and government authorities have attempted to reduce the ethnic minority participation in society in Arizona and the United States. The chronology will give readers a quick guide and reference to the number of and distinct ways (legal, educational, political, and cultural) that measures of exclusion have been implemented. It will also demonstrate that local, state, and federal authorities in many ways have not changed their strategies for handling new immigrants and the country's changing demographics over the past one hundred years.

The reader will notice that immigration policies for more than a century have been promulgated by and large from a unilateral perspective, without consideration of the global political, economic, social, and environmental factors that have driven immigration to the United States. The following chronology describes briefly many of the major pieces of legislation and measures that are mentioned in the chapters throughout *Arizona Firestorm*, but is not intended to be a comprehensive list of all measures and laws of exclusion.

**1882**—U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act. This federal law placed a moratorium on immigrants from China and excluded individuals based on race. In 1952, the federal laws excluding Asian immigrants were repealed through the McCarran-Warren Act, though the number of immigrants allowed to enter the country from Asian countries remained low.

**1910s**—Arizona's new state-elected officials (statehood in 1912) passed numerous Jim Crow laws including: (1) Prohibiting intermarriage among

whites and "tabooed groups," Asians, African Americans, and Native Americans; (2) Educational segregation between whites, Mexicans, Native Americans, and African Americans; (3) Restricting job opportunities for nonwhites and noncitizens; and (4) Prohibiting Asians from purchasing land. (See chapters 2 and 4 in this volume.)

**1924**—Congress passed the Asian Exclusion and National Origins Act: This placed numerical quotas on those allowed to enter the country, and expanded the Chinese Exclusion Act to include immigrants from all of the countries within the "Asian Pacific Triangle," such as the Philippines, Japan, Laos, Siam (Thailand), Cambodia, Singapore (then a British colony), Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar), India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Malaysia.

**1930s**—Even before the Great Depression, during economic downturns, the practice of deportation began. In the 1930s, state authorities used the U.S. Border Patrol and federal troops to "repatriate" as many as one million Mexican-origin workers and residents in Arizona and throughout the Southwest, many of whom were U.S. citizens.

**1954**—In response to the recession of 1953 and an overabundant supply of labor, which was spurred in part by the Bracero Program (1945–1964 guest worker program), the U.S. Border Patrol initiated "Operation Wetback": a mass deportation effort throughout the Southwest.

**1960s**—*De facto* segregation of Mexican students in Arizona continued, even after the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision *Brown v. Board of Education* (see Leeman; Gándara; and O'Leary et al., all three of this volume).

**1971**—Twenty-three years before California's Proposition 187 which denied state funded services to undocumented immigrants, Arizona's (and Pennsylvania's) legislatures passed laws denying state benefits to noncitizens. The U.S. Supreme Court repealed the law with its 1971 *Graham v. Richardson* ruling.

**1975**—*United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.* This U.S. Supreme Court decision allowed race to be considered in immigration enforcement of Mexicans in which "the likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor." (See Chin et al., this volume.)

**1986**—Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). The law granted amnesty for long-time unauthorized residents, created employer sanctions for companies that hired undocumented workers, and increased border enforcement.

**1988**—Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, making English the state's "official language." In 1998, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the law violated the First Amendment Rights of non-English-speaking citizens.

**1992**—Nogales, Arizona, parent, Miriam Flores filed a lawsuit against the state of Arizona, arguing that the state is not providing an adequate education for English language learner (ELL) students. The case became known as *Horne v. Flores*, went to the U.S. Supreme Court, and in 2011 was still tied up in U.S. District Court (see Gándara, this volume).



**1994**—Operation Gatekeeper signaled the first major shift of the twentieth century regarding border and immigration enforcement. The enhanced border enforcement program instituted under President Bill Clinton redirected migrants away from urban California and Texas, toward less populated areas such as the desert in Arizona.

**1994**—Following Operation Gatekeeper, the U.S. Border Patrol implemented Operation Safeguard along the Arizona-Sonora border, which resulted in heightened enforcement through an increase in border patrol agents and advanced technology. This was part of the agency's change in overall strategy of apprehending undocumented immigrants after they crossed the border to a "strategy of deterrence." The approach created a deadly corridor for immigrants attempting to cross through the Arizona desert.

**1996**—President Bill Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which apportioned greater funding so the U.S. Border Patrol could implement its "strategy of deterrence."

**1996**—The Arizona Supreme Court ruled in *Arizona v. González-Gutierrez* that "enforcement of immigration laws often involves a relevant consideration of ethnic factors." The court reaffirmed that law enforcement could use race to determine reasonable suspicion regarding Mexicans, stating that "Mexican ancestry alone, that is, Latino appearance, is not enough to establish reasonable cause, but if the occupants' dress or hair style are associated with people currently living in Mexico, such characteristics may be sufficient" (see Chin et al., this volume).

**2000**—Arizona voters passed Proposition 203, which banned bilingual education for ELLs.

**2005**—Congress passed the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, which increased criminalization of undocumented people by making it a crime to be unauthorized in the United States. Previously, "unlawful presence" in the country was a civil, not criminal, violation of immigration law.

**2006**—Arizona voters passed Proposition 300 which prohibits students who cannot prove legal residency from paying in-state tuition, or from receiving state financial aid (see O'Leary et al., this volume).

**2010**—The Arizona state legislature passed and Governor Janice Brewer signed a number of stringent anti-Latino and anti-immigrant laws:

- SB 1070, the "Show me your papers law." This law was an overt strategy by state level politicians to supersede federal immigration law and raised the specter of racial profiling (see Chin et al. in this volume).

- HB 2281. This law targeted Tucson Unified School District, the city's largest. It financially punishes school districts that conduct classes that "promote the overthrow of the government," create race resentment, and advocate for ethnic solidarity over individualism (see Ochoa O'Leary et al., in this volume).
- State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Horne launched an audit of Arizona teachers in an attempt to exclude teachers who speak English with accents (see Leeman, this volume).
- Voters approved Proposition 107 and Governor Janice Brewer signed this law that bans state government units including colleges and universities from using race, ethnicity, or gender in decisions regarding hiring or acceptance.

2011—Some Arizona legislators and a few conservative federal lawmakers proposed "clarifications" of the Fourteenth Amendment to deny birthright citizenship to the children of undocumented immigrants (see Gonzales, this volume). These measures failed.

- Led by Arizona Senate President Russell Pearce, state lawmakers attempted to pass an omnibus bill that would have barred undocumented children from attending school, prohibited unauthorized immigrants from driving or purchasing a vehicle, and would have denied the ability of undocumented immigrants to obtain a marriage license in the state. The bill died in the legislature after pressure from the state's business industry.

# 4

# The Economic Impact of Immigrants in Arizona[1]

*Judith Gans*

## Introduction

ARIZONA'S 362-MILE BORDER with Mexico is integral to its history. It shapes immigration's impact on the state and colors the ways Arizona grapples with myriad elements of immigration debates: numbers and types of immigrants, the extent of unauthorized immigration, and the impact of immigrants on the state's fiscal and economic health. This study is intended to provide data and analysis that deepens our understanding of the economic consequences of immigration in Arizona. To this end, I analyze the role immigrants play, both as consumers and as workers, and examine their fiscal impact on the state's budget. The availability of data dictated that this analysis is done for calendar year 2004.[2]

A few definitions of terms are in order. The terms *immigrant* and *foreign born* are used interchangeably. These terms, in turn, divide into two subcategories: naturalized citizens and noncitizens. As in the U.S. Census, immigrants or foreign born are defined as the *sum* of naturalized citizens plus noncitizens.

Arizona's foreign-born population increased dramatically between 1990 and 2004 by more than 300 percent. Most immigrants are of working age and have come to the United States seeking employment. This is a central determinant of their economic impact in Arizona.

The likelihood that many of Arizona's noncitizens are unauthorized immigrants has made public discussion of immigration politically contentious. In Arizona and elsewhere, public discourse equates *immigration* and "*illegal*